Historians walk two tight ropes when they write about the past: one rope divides generalization from particularization and the other divides continuity from change. If a scholar falls off the rope and lands on one side or the other, the result is a book that oversimplifies and distorts the portrait of the past. Historians must find a way to identify broad patterns without losing variations and local nuance; they must explain change over time without losing sight of all that remained the same. It is a difficult balancing act, but when done well tight-rope walking produces an interpretation of the past that most effectively captures its complexity. Aaron Sheehan-Dean's mastery of those skills has produced a must-read study of the American Civil War that explains better than any existing book in the field how Americans deployed violence during the conflict. Unlike scholars who proffer generalizations that the war was either a restrained or an atrocious conflict, or that it changed from a limited to total war in a linear trajectory across time, Sheehan Dean argues that the war was both restrained and violent, and that local patterns varied across time and space. In a study that considers both the regular and irregular aspects of the war, and places it in a comparative context with other global civil and national conflicts of the 19 th Century, he identifies the factors that escalated and the factors that restrained violence during the war. Where some historians conflate retaliation with revenge, Sheehan-Dean explains how it functioned to "end breaches of the customary laws of war (333)." Sheehan-Dean argues that both sides committed violence that was lawful under contemporary rules of war but that was also unnecessary. Adeptly walking the tight-rope in a section on Sherman's campaign for Atlanta, for example, Sheehan-Dean explains that the controversial Union general followed the laws of war during his bombardment of Atlanta and expulsion of civilians, that his practices had been in long use by other Union generals in other theaters, and that his actions produced fewer non-combatant deaths than should be expected given a comparative context. However, such lawful actions enormously increased civilian suffering. The campaign for Atlanta in 1864 was simultaneously "restrained" and "awful (303)."
Although Sheehan-Dean complicates the limited to hard-war trajectory that dominates previous scholarship, and supports his claim that there was not a steady growth of violence over time, he depicts a surge in violence in multiple regions and aspects of the war in 1864. Armies improved control over soldiers so battlefield clashes were more lethal and deserters faced execution more often, frustration caused both sides to resort to unjust violence that they had 
